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BRITAIN

AND

BOER INDEPENDENCE

BY

EDOUARD NAVILLE

GENEVA

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
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BOER INDEPENDENCE

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

OF

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PREFACE.

A NEW brochure by M. Naville has just appeared which completes and brings up to date his former one,[1] written before the outbreak of the war, and it lays before us the probable consequences of the present situation. Like its admirable predecessor, this study is characterised by clearness and conciseness, absence of sentimentality, and a thorough acquaintance with the subject under treatment. The British public will no doubt appreciate it as the unbiassed opinion of the enlightened portion of our European neighbours.

M. VETCH.

[1] The Transvaal Question. W. Blackwood & Sons.

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FRANCHISE AND INDEPENDENCE.

Six months ago, when the South African storm was brewing, but might still have been dispersed, and before a shot had been fired, I endeavoured to show my countrymen how the contest should be regarded by the light of history and of the policy of the Transvaal from the time of its constitution as an independent State. My conclusion then was that the partisans of the Boers would do well to advise them to yield on the question of the franchise, since this was the fulcrum, and in a way the epitome, of England's claims.

And now more than ever I believe that this was the true and wise policy, and the one which would not only have maintained the existence of

the Transvaal, but would also have contributed to its prosperity and to the extraordinary development to which it may aspire; and I will go further and declare that the true friends of the Boers—I mean of the people themselves, not of the Government—are those who have spoken to them in this way. The poor Boers! into what a state have they been brought by the violent attacks against England with which the Continental press has rung during the last year! I appeal to their passionate admirers, and to those who declare themselves their most fervent partisans. Over and over again you have told them, and you repeat day by day, that this infamous war is the work of Mr Chamberlain, who is in the pay of the capitalists. Whilst it was still possible to avert the conflict, while negotiations were still pending, a hundred papers unceasingly clamoured to the Transvaalers that England grudged them their independence, and that she was only seeking a pretext to seize upon the gold mines. You have encouraged President Krüger to persist in his heroic attitude—that is to say, in his invincible determination to accept no compromise. And now, what is the spectacle before us? On one side a small people fighting for its independence—that is, for a cause lost beforehand—with a heroism which no Swiss can see without emotion; and opposed to them an

immense empire which will recoil before no sacrifice in men or gold, constrained to impose on this small nation an unquestioned supremacy, and to put an end to that independence which she can no longer tolerate, although but yesterday she was quite willing to leave it to them. Can you say that your counsels and your encouragement have counted for nothing in the sad situation we all deplore?

I will not refer again to the history of the dispute, which I have described elsewhere, nor to the Uitlander claims, nor even to the negotiations. Suffice it to say that at the time of the rupture England demanded the right of a vote for the Uitlanders after a five years' residence, a representation of the mining districts not exceeding one-fourth of the Volksraad, and the right for the new deputies of using the English language in its deliberations.

After having himself proposed the five years' franchise, Krüger withdrew it when he saw that England would not purchase it at the price of the abrogation of the Convention of 1884 and the renunciation of her right of suzerainty. He offered next a seven years' franchise, but what a franchise!—a law which was only a delusion, and was so well conceived that the end annulled the beginning, and that its application depended necessarily on the goodwill of the executive.

The two adversaries were face to face, darting threatening glances at one another, when the silence was broken by Krüger's ultimatum, which gave England forty-eight hours wherein to withdraw her troops, on the pretext that her preparations threatened and endangered the Transvaal. "True, we fired the first shot," said Mr Fisher, one of the three delegates now in America, "but only because England had massed her troops close to our frontiers." The campaign which has followed has shown what England's preparations were!

Now let us suppose that instead of war Krüger had chosen the other alternative, that he had adopted in good faith and loyally the five years' franchise, which he himself had proposed, where would the Transvaal be to-day? It would have a Raad of which at most a quarter would be composed of representatives of the mining districts which make the prosperity of the country, and from whose work not only the State but Krüger and his immediate surroundings derive much profit. The Uitlanders who had passed five years in the country would have become Transvaalers, and would have set business on a satisfactory footing by the aid of their intelligence and resources. From the moment that they took part in the government of the country they would have had no interest in trying to extend

English sovereignty; they would not have attempted to replace the Vierkleur by the Union Jack; and, like the burghers, they would have become the defenders of the country's independence.

As a matter of policy this would have been the wisest course. Clever men, and even eminent jurists, have reproached England for insisting on the question of electoral rights. They tell us it was an interference in the interior administration of a country to which no foreign nation has a right. This would be true if the demand for franchise were presented alone and for itself, and simply claimed as a right without compensation. But we must remember this demand was a compromise. In exchange for the franchise England gave up the claims which especially concerned the Uitlanders, and on account of which they had appealed to the mother country. England refrained from examining separately and obtaining redress for all those crying wrongs which in Europe are matters for consular or diplomatic protection, and left to the Uitlanders the task of seeking justice from the Raad so soon as they should have entered it. Theirs was to be the task of struggling with Krüger and his party when once they were members of the legislative body, and of defending their rights from the moment they were in a position to do so.

One does not see how this proposal was an attack on the independence of the Transvaal. It seems rather a means by which to guarantee it. By thus concentrating her claims on one point, England disarmed herself; for had the franchise been openly granted in good faith, Mr Chamberlain, as he himself says, would have had no further right to interfere. The more the franchise was extended, the greater number of citizens would have been concerned in the independence of the country and the defence of its flag; and the less would any fresh action on the part of England have been justified, and have been likely to occur. "We were ready to make every concession," again says Mr Fisher, "on condition that our liberty and independence were guaranteed." Why then refuse this most important concession, which was in itself the best guarantee? And yet President Krüger was not without warnings sent even from the ranks of the burghers. We will cite but one example.

In 1895, after the last franchise law, which was merely prohibitive, had been voted, the Uitlanders presented a petition with 35,000 signatures to the Raad, entreating them not thus to close the door to them, nor to refuse them all political rights. Nearly a thousand burghers supported the petition. It is true others protested,

and maintained that the law should be carried out in all its severity. The debates of the Raad lasted three days.

Mr Lucas Meyer, the president of the committee who had to examine the petition, at once declared that he was with the minority, and proposed to meet the demand favourably and to submit it to the assembly of the burghers, or, as we should say in Switzerland, to the Referendum. Krüger began by saying that the petitioners, by signing a document of this kind, proved themselves disloyal and rebels to the law. It was in vain that several members of the Raad protested, and with great talent defended the cause of the Uitlanders and of liberalism, insisting on the advantages to be derived from making friends of them instead of armed enemies, who would go on increasing in strength and finish by overthrowing everything. Krüger remained inflexible; one of the members of the Commission was extremely violent, inveighed against the perpetual claims of which they could only rid themselves by war, and added that the sooner it came the better. He proposed to pass to the order of the day on this petition, and it was his proposal that was adopted. On leaving the debate several members, more clear sighted and more liberal than the others, did not fail to declare that this vote meant the loss of their independence. "Now," said an old Boer, "our

country is lost. Nothing can settle this question but war, and war can have but one end. Krüger and his Dutchmen have deprived us of our independence more effectually than Shepstone ever did."

If we look for the motive which has led the Transvaal to this fatal obstinacy, it is not difficult to find. The grant of the franchise to the Uitlanders, even in proportions as limited as those proposed last year, would have put an end to the omnipotence of Krüger and his Dutchmen. In spite of their small number, it is certain that the delegates of the Uitlanders would have exercised a great influence on the Raad. It would no longer have been so easy to legislate by resolution in secret sittings, and a law of "no jurisdiction," like that which disarmed the Supreme Court, would not have passed so easily. Secret funds would not have been voted so willingly, whatever might have been their use—armaments or any other purpose. The question would have been asked, To what end these Creusot guns and Mauser rifles? since, England once satisfied, they were threatened by no one.

Above all, these deputies would have become a rallying-point for the very weak liberal elements which still exist in the present Raad, although their voices are stifled by the Krüger party. The President remembers that at the elections before

last it was only with great difficulty that he succeeded in beating Joubert. If we can apply the word liberalism at all to the Transvaal, it is to Joubert that it is due, and yet it is not him that Krüger can reproach with want of patriotism. According to the Johannesburg Afrikanders, had it depended on Joubert, there would have been no war—he would never have allowed the position of the Uitlanders to become what it was.

With the entrance, then, of the Uitlanders into the Raad, an Opposition would have been formed with which the Government would have had to reckon. Now, thanks to his efforts at the last election, Krüger had managed to almost suppress the Opposition, and had become absolute master of the Raad. To admit the Uitlanders would have been to lose the fruit of his labours and of his intrigues. The Transvaal is now a republic only in name; for Krüger possesses an autocratic power, not only because he disposes of the votes of the Raad, but because all the laws which he causes to be voted—justice, franchise, police, municipal organisation, and so forth—add to his authority and tend to concentrate the power in his hands.

But notwithstanding his omnipotence, it is doubtful if Krüger would have succeeded in drawing the Transvaalers into the war had it been a question solely of the franchise. To the farmers far from the towns, tending their flocks and

herds on their vast grazing lands, what did it matter whether the Uitlanders had the right to vote or not? Provided they were left at peace in their occupations, and above all not bothered about taxes, they were perfectly indifferent to the affairs of the Government, and not in the least inclined to excite themselves about what was done in Pretoria or Johannesburg.

If they were to be induced to make war, their most sensitive chord had to be struck. They must be made to believe that their independence was threatened; then, one might be sure that as one man, young and old, they would march to defend it. And it was this that Krüger managed to bring about with marvellous cleverness. To attain his end he had at hand a sure means—that was, to raise in the face of England the question of the suzerainty. Up to that time the Transvaal had lived under the *régime* of the Convention of London of 1884, Article iv. of which obliged her not to conclude any treaty or engagement with any other State except the Orange Free State, "until the same has been approved by her Majesty the Queen." This article, however, had hampered her very little, and had certainly not prevented her from sending Dr Leyds to Europe, and seeking by all possible means alliances and support against England.

And this suzerainty, over which there has been

so much discussion, and against which the Transvaal protests so loudly, England, while claiming, has never exercised. In spite of its existence, the Boers have quietly elaborated all those laws which, being directed against the Uitlanders, have rendered their position unbearable. And, returning to the franchise question, the suzerainty of England has made itself so little felt in the home affairs of the Transvaal, that she has allowed the Boers to proceed in a direction opposite to that followed by all the other nations in the world. For whilst in all countries, and especially in those in process of formation whose development depends on the influx of foreigners, electoral rights are perpetually extended, the Transvaal, under the influence of Krüger, has, on the contrary, more and more restricted them. In Switzerland (for instance, Geneva), there is scarcely a legislature in which stress is not laid on the necessity and benefit of making the strangers settled amongst us into citizens interested in the prosperity and defence of the country. In the Transvaal they have done the exact opposite; beginning with a franchise of two years, they have now reached one of twelve years, and the law which sanctions it is prohibitive, at least for the English. Where it concerns Dutchmen prepared to support Krüger's policy it is quite another thing;

and even in the new law there is an Article (v.) which allows the executive to naturalise them with no other condition than the oath. It would, indeed, be difficult to interfere less with the independence of the Transvaal than England has done, because not only has Krüger and his Government been able to render the situation unbearable for the Uitlanders, but he has always repulsed all their claims until, at the end of their resources, they appealed to the mother country.

In politics there are some words which occasionally acquire a value quite out of proportion to the facts; and this is what has happened with the word suzerainty. I repeat again what I asserted elsewhere, that it was not England that raised the question: she has always declared that she would abide by the Convention of 1884, and Mr Chamberlain affirmed it in the most explicit manner in his despatch of 22nd September, which closed the era of negotiations.

England may perhaps be accused of setting too great importance on the word suzerainty while she has so little availed herself of the fact, and of clinging with too much persistence to the Convention of 1884—a Convention which was badly drawn, allowing of contradictory interpretations, and bore too clearly the stamp of the circumstances in which it was formulated. It

was the work of a Government anxious to rid itself of a difficulty, and not to solve it in a definite manner. But, bad as it was, and weak as was the grasp it gave England, it was nevertheless the only instrument that Power had at her disposal, the only means of maintaining her claims and of obtaining the fulfilment of the engagements entered into with her by the Boers. Not that the Boers thought twice about violating it; they paid hardly any attention to the clauses which forbade their making raids outside their frontiers. But England had seen the derisive manner in which the promises had been kept which were made to the Uitlanders after the Jameson Raid, and she heard these Uitlanders persistently urging her not to be content with simple promises, but to exact formal guarantees. Under these conditions she could not give up the Convention of 1884, and still less could she undertake never again to interfere in the affairs of the Transvaal, as Krüger would have had her do when he proposed the five years' franchise.

If political astuteness consists in knowing how to get the better of your opponent on every occasion, we may well admit that President Krüger has proved himself a master of the art, and that on this score he deserves the admiration which Bismarck felt for him. But in this case he has not succeeded, for with one blow Mr Chamberlain

rent the net spread to catch him. His despatch of the 22nd of September, which let loose on him the thunderbolts of the pro-Boers in England and on the Continent, was a proof of his clear-sightedness. Krüger was determined not to grant the five years' franchise. It suited him to pretend to favour it, but he had quite decided not to introduce this lever into the political edifice of the Transvaal, for sooner or later it would be sure to overthrow his omnipotence. And let it not be thought that this is an unjust suspicion against him: he proved it when he withdrew his proposals on finding that England refused to tie her own hands and reduce herself to a state of impotence. In explaining the withdrawal in a despatch of the 16th of September, Mr Reitz takes care to tell us that in making these proposals the Government went so far that it ran a risk of being disowned by the Raad. But to those who know the absolute power which Krüger exercises over this assembly, the phrase is only a piece of ill-disguised hypocrisy. The Raad would probably not have disavowed the Government in the first instance; some time would have been allowed to pass, then they would have made use of the opposition of the assembly to annul the concession already granted. And in that case in what position would England, rendered helpless and powerless by her engagements, have

found herself, and what would Mr Chamberlain's enemies have said?

It was absolutely certain that if the Boers shifted the dispute to the question of the suzerainty, they would be met by England with an emphatic refusal to go behind the Convention of 1884. This was precisely the weapon they wanted: suzerainty and independence are words which are mutually exclusive. From that moment they could cry aloud that England, who wished only to assert her suzerainty, was threatening their independence, and at once they would see the Boers flock to the standard, willing to endure any sacrifice for liberty's sake. They could then represent not only to the Transvaalers, but to the whole world, as Mr Reitz did in his despatch of 16th of September, "the continual threats and manifest dangers to which our precious independence is exposed by the claims to suzerainty which H.M.'s Government advances." Thus, not to speak of the effect on their own country, they were sure to rouse the sympathy of all Europe, which instinctively takes the part of a small people bravely fighting for its independence.

Krüger summed up his policy perfectly in a phrase pronounced at the conference of Bloemfontein. Speaking of the five years' franchise which Sir Alfred Milner demanded, he declared

it would be worse than annexation. In other words, rather lose their independence than destroy the existing system in which he and his oligarchy are all powerful.

I appeal to the friends of the Boers. Can we find a sadder or more tragic sight than that which we have had before us for the last six months? A little people fighting for a cause lost beforehand, and thus fighting because, to speak the truth, they have been deceived by those who govern them. What heroism lavished fruitlessly! what blood shed in vain! what innumerable sufferings which might have been avoided if there had not been purposely introduced into the dispute a vital interest which was in no way attacked! Think for a moment what the Transvaal would be, what its present and future might be, if it had listened to the voice of reason, and not allowed itself to be led meekly by Krüger and his Dutch *entourage*. In a few years, when passions are somewhat calmed, when the blast of anglophobia which blows over the whole of Europe has died away, when events can be judged with more tranquillity and with restored reason, I have no doubt that the judgment passed on Krüger will be severe: his will be ranked amongst those Governments—alas, too numerous!—who have led their country into disaster to maintain their own power.

From the moment when the discussion was

shifted from the question of the franchise to that of independence the whole debate entirely altered its aspect. Henceforth it had to lead to war, and the war could have but one end—the loss of independence. And it is here that Krüger's cleverness has been disastrous. Rather than make concessions which were distasteful to him and to his partisans he preferred to stake the independence of his country, and consequently its very existence, in the terrible game which is being played—and when the game is lost it is too late to change the stakes. If the maintenance of the present rule and independence are synonymous terms, if the two are so indissolubly bound together that the destruction of the one must bring about the loss of the other, then indeed the independence of the Boers is at an end. England cannot leave them that, for to do so would be to ingenuously declare that there had never been a reason for the war. We read daily in the papers that a people who can defend their independence so bravely deserves to keep it. The idea is generous, and is prompted by a noble sentiment; but can we not see that the solution is unavoidable, and that no other is possible? This independence, so precious to the nation, should never have been weighed in the scales with the interests of the Government and its party. It should never have been knowingly and willingly

risked. "Rather annexation," said Krüger, "than the alternative" — namely, to grant the Uitlanders the minimum of their most justifiable claims. It is you who have made the dilemma, and now it is too late to go back on your choice!

DR LEYDS' MISSION.

In order the more effectually to excite the Boers against England, were they not told that their property and goods were in danger, and that the rapacious English would seize their farms and cattle? This report was widely circulated, and the testimony of prisoners has been published in the papers which has shown that the idea had taken firm hold of a great number of them. But this calumny, however widely spread, could only act on the minds of the ignorant: it was not an argument that could be openly produced, nor one that could sway the policy of the Government.

What was much more serious, and has certainly contributed to force the Boers into war, is Dr Leyds' mission to Europe. Dr Leyds is no Transvaaler, but one of those Dutchmen adopted by President Krüger, and at present one of his most useful tools, though formerly on very bad terms with him; so that he is a man who has the greatest interest in preserving the existing order of things.

Are we to believe that Dr Leyds informed his Government accurately of the dispositions of the Powers among whom he had taken up his residence? Or had he not rather contributed to propagate the illusion, which no doubt reigned in the minds of a large proportion of the Transvaalers, that Europe and America would never allow the South African republics to founder? It is only too evident that Krüger reckoned on a more substantial support from Europe than mere ambulances or single mercenaries; and great indeed must have been the disappointment of those who cherished the idea that they could count on the German Government. Since 1877 the Government had several times endeavoured to form relations with Germany, and they remembered the Emperor's telegram on the occasion of the Jameson Raid. But sympathy is one thing and the risk of being involved in a terrible war whose consequences none could foresee is quite another, and between the two is not a step but an abyss. No one knew this better than Dr Leyds, and it was his duty to warn his adopted countrymen that when they turned to Europe for aid, all the help they would get would be newspaper articles.

Instead of this, chimerical hopes were cultivated; the violent and hostile attacks against England which filled the German and in some

part the French press were fostered; and surprising items of news, originated in Brussels, were hawked in the streets of Paris and Berlin, and served as a theme for the newspapers to exalt the Boers to the skies or to sink the English lower than the earth. Profiting by the unbounded liberty of the English press, Leyds possessed noisy and energetic allies even in the enemy's country. Is it surprising that the Boers sincerely believed that since the whole world testified their sympathy for them, that feeling would be transformed into solid support? Such unanimous demonstrations as were described to them could surely not leave the Governments indifferent, but must compel them to act.

Here again, I do not hesitate to say, the Boers were deceived, and I need no better proof than the mission of the three delegates who have just left Europe. Can we believe, as they tell us, that their mission was simply to visit Holland? and was not their abrupt departure an admission that they had nothing to hope for from Europe? If the eyes of the delegates have been opened, their friends at any rate do not seem inclined to renounce their real or fancied illusions. In a document circulated on the Continent and in England by a Dutch association, we are told that the three delegates had an interview of a private and confidential character with the Dutch

Minister of Foreign Affairs, "in the course of which his Excellency M. de Beaufort made the most amiable promises to the deputation." However amiable may have been his language, was it to hear such promises that the deputation took the journey to Europe? and of what use can such promises be to the defenders of Kroonstadt or Pretoria?

Once again, who are the true friends of the Boers—those who lure them to their ruin with these chimeras, or those who strive to show them the situation in all its hard and tragical reality, and seek to persuade them not to aggravate it further?

One need not be a great prophet to foresee that Germany would remain neutral in the conflict. What is policy nowadays? It is the calculation by each nation of its own interests, the search after means to further them and to avoid what is contrary to them. In the twentieth century we do not fight in support of ideas, however generous they may be; we only make war to protect our interests, and, moreover, these interests must be of the first importance, of vital importance, in order to set in movement, not as formerly troops of professional soldiers, but armed nations.

Now I would ask you what interest has Germany in maintaining what is called the liberty of the Boers—that is to say, the right and power not

to grant that liberty to any but themselves, to remain an oligarchy recruited at its own will, and to exploit a majority of foreigners to whom they owe their prosperity and wealth? It is to the interest of Germany, on the contrary, as it is to all countries who need to spread and swarm abroad, for the Boer system to disappear and to be replaced by the English colonial system. One often hears of a possible conflict between England and Germany, but this eventuality has always seemed to me highly improbable, if not indeed impossible. Germany reaps too many advantages from the English colonial empire to dream of, I will not say destroying it, but even weakening it. We know that in India and Australia there are numerous German colonies which have established influential houses of business, through which the industrial products of the mother country are every year introduced in larger proportions. These colonies live in perfect security under the English flag, whose duty and responsibility it is to protect them. There are there no privileges in favour of the English or to the prejudice of the foreigner, nor that officialism which hampers the development of German colonisation. As soon as the Transvaal becomes an English colony the Germans are sure to flock to it: they will be as quick as the English to profit by the open door, and to begin

to work the immense wealth of mines which the country contains, for from the accounts of travellers there are many other besides gold mines.

And these are the very Germans who were supposed to lend the support of their mighty arm to President Krüger, to help him to keep that door hermetically sealed through which they are waiting to pass in crowds. Truly such conduct would have been at least strange!

I know we shall hear speak of historical traditions, the right which a small people has to exist as well as a great one—a right the more to be respected where the small people is weak and less able to defend itself. But surely it is not to the greater Germany founded by Bismarck that we must here look for a rule of conduct or for considerations of this kind. We must not forgot that the first act which raised Prussia from the position of inferiority in which the Peace of Olmütz had left her was the crushing of Denmark. On this little country Prussia tried her army, reorganised by Von Moltke and Roon, yet this trial blow was made in concert with Austria. Two years later Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, and other states lost their independence, and were annexed to Prussia. And yet the historical traditions of these countries, the rights acquired by a past illuminated with glorious episodes, were

quite different to those of the Boers. To take part with the Boers would have been to follow a policy directly opposed to that which contributed to make Prussia first and then Germany the Power she is to-day.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE TRANSVAAL.

I DO not know if President Krüger has taken the same oath with regard to England that, as tradition has it, Hannibal's father made his son take with regard to Rome. Any way, since the "Great Trek" of 1834, in which he took part as a lad, Krüger has evinced for England as bitter a hate as ever Carthaginian felt for the Roman. To this hatred he has added an ambition which he shares with a great number of Dutch—namely, to drive out the British element from South Africa, so that "from the Zambesi to Simon's Bay Africa shall be for the Afrikander," that is to say, for the Dutch: for according to M. Reitz, from whom I take the quotation, the English Afrikander is no Afrikander at all.

It is doubtless this very settled determination to have the south of Africa all to themselves, and to banish those whom they are pleased to call the oppressors—namely, the British element—that dictated the conduct of President Steyn,

chief of the Government of the Orange Free State.

If, in my opinion, posterity cannot help being severe in its condemnation of President Krüger, its verdict will certainly be not more merciful towards President Steyn. Since the Convention of Bloemfontein which gave it its independence, the Orange Free State has lived in peace and tranquillity and on the best terms with England. Its existence has only been troubled by quarrels with the natives and by an attack coming from the Transvaal. During the period of anarchy through which the latter State passed between the Sand River Convention and 1877, the frontier was once crossed by a body of Transvaalers, and a part of the north of the Orange Free State invaded; but they promptly retired when they saw that resistance would be offered. Since that time the Orange Free State has had nothing whatever to fear for its independence. On the contrary, the President, Sir John Brand, succeeded in maintaining such cordial relations with his powerful neighbour as left nothing to be desired. A two years' franchise was granted, and there had never been any thought of restriction. It is true there are no gold mines in the country, and the influx of foreigners is not nearly so great as in the Transvaal.

But if there was no cause of complaint against

England, relations with its neighbours beyond the Vaal have been several times, to say the least, strained: first at the time of the invasion of which I have spoken, and again when the Transvaal attempted to close to trade those fords and passes which gave access to the Free State, and so to benefit their own railway. Finally, what vexed the Orangists was the marked predilection of Krüger for Dutchmen brought out from Europe —the Leyds, Mansfelts, and others—to the exclusion of the Afrikanders, whom he considered as infected with a weakness for England.

One of the first consequences of the Jameson Raid was the election of President Steyn, gained over an opponent whose tendencies, being favourable to England, were quite opposed to his; and another result of this ill-omened expedition was to turn the sympathies of the Orangists to the side of the Boers. Having been elected president, Steyn allowed himself to be persuaded by President Krüger to make a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, which is of very recent date, and is the joint work of the two presidents. A treaty of this kind, which risks the very existence of a State, and which great Powers only accept with a thousand precautions, can be justified solely by the most serious circumstances, and when absolutely forced on the parties by very real dangers. Now Steyn knew perfectly well that no one

grudged the Orange Free State her liberty; only England could threaten it, and with England there was no discussion, nothing which could trouble their harmony. So that there was no reciprocity whatever in the alliance with the Transvaal, and the advantage was entirely one-sided, for the Free State could reap none. To support the policy of President Krüger was to risk the existence of his country with his eyes open, for no one knew better than Steyn the true character of the claims made by England on the Transvaal. The motive power which drove Steyn to conclude this alliance was that he shared Krüger's ambition, which, added to the desire to remain in power, is the true cause of the war. Both men aspired to rid South Africa of the British element, or at least to crush and subjugate it, and to establish that Dutch empire of which Mr Reitz has traced the outlines. This idea has been treated as a phantom, or even as a calumny, invented by the friends of England; but a study of the conduct of the Boer Government from the Convention of Pretoria till the late events confirms its truth very clearly. And it was this ambition which incited the Krüger Government to arm long before the Jameson Raid.

One often imagines the Transvaal State to be a sort of Arcadia whose inhabitants only ask to live

in patriarchal simplicity, content with their lands and their institutions. Events have shown that we must alter this view considerably, and that such an idyllic picture is far from the reality. I need not point out that these shepherds do not turn with disdain from the gold which the Uitlanders have dug out of their land. But if we consider their policy towards their neighbours, we see that they have never looked on the two Conventions entered into with England as engagements which they ought to keep scrupulously. In their estimation they were concessions forced from England by victory, and which should lead to others. As to England, there was no reason to consider her: she had been beaten at Laing's Nek and Majuba Hill, and immediately after she had made peace.

Now, if there are clauses which are clear and defy ambiguity, and that in both Conventions, it is those articles—and they are long and very minute—which fix the boundaries of the South African Republic territory, and which declare that the Transvaal Government shall adhere strictly to these limitations, and shall take care that her emigrants shall not be allowed to violate any of these frontiers, nor any expedition on neighbouring territory. These articles have been a dead letter to the Boers. Scarcely was the Convention of Pretoria concluded than they in-

vaded the country of the Bechuanas, and for some years filibustering expeditions—raids, to use the term consecrated by custom—were led into the territory under British protection until Mr Gladstone was obliged to send out troops under Sir Charles Warren, and Lord Derby, then Minister for the Colonies, agreed that the conduct of the Boers was a *casus belli*. However, war was not declared. England yielded, the Boers went home, but they obtained modifications of the Convention of Pretoria, which became the Convention of London, 1884, under the provisions of which the two States have lived until now. Mr Reitz, in his long indictment against England, published by Mr Stead, speaks of Mr Gladstone as a man whom the Boers will never forget. Mr Krüger also has several times made allusion in his speeches to the magnanimity of England when, yielding to the generous ideas of her Prime Minister, she gave the Transvaal back her independence. Who will not allow that it is a singular way to acknowledge the magnanimity of an adversary to begin by violating the engagement entered into with him, and straightway to invade his territory, which it was stipulated in the most unequivocal terms should not be touched? Was it for this that England restored her independence to the Republic? No kind of necessity,

no motive but the desire for aggrandisement and of conquering more territory, impelled the Transvaalers to send these expeditions for which Krüger is to a great extent responsible. After the death of Joubert his biographers have told us that he categorically refused to follow Krüger into Bechuanaland, "because," said he, "when you have just made an agreement with a neighbour, your first duty is to respect it."

Thus, at the first violation of the Convention of Pretoria, not only England did not insist on the Transvaal respecting it: she did not restrict it or make it more galling for the Boers. On the contrary, she gave up several rights which were hers by reason of her suzerainty, and only reserved to herself the control of treaties with foreign nations, and that pre-eminence in fact which left the Boers free play. And this is the first of those acts of oppression which the Boers and their friends never tire of denouncing!

Not having succeeded in the West, and in spite of the Convention of 1884 which had just been signed, and which, like the former one, obliged them to respect established frontiers, the Boers started raiding in other directions. First it was towards the south, towards the southern frontier of Swaziland. Article xii. of the Convention stipulates that the complete independence

of the Swazis is recognised. But several years previously some Boer families, under the direction of M. Ferreira, a Portuguese by birth, settled in the south of Swaziland and formed a community to which they gave the name of the Little Free State. In 1888 Ferreira concluded a written treaty with the king of the Swazis, which made over to him the sovereignty of the district and authorised him to annex it to the Transvaal. By virtue of Article xii. the Boer Government could not avoid applying to England, and the application was made in the terms which characterise Boer diplomacy. Her Majesty's Government was solicited to permit the Transvaal to undertake the administration of this territory immediately, for the case was urgent and could suffer no delay. It was said elsewhere that the addition of the territory of the Little Free State to that of the Republic could not be considered as a concession on the part of her Majesty, for this addition was an imperative necessity, and there was no right to be opposed to it. Here, again, although it was a flagrant violation of the Convention of 1884, England offered no opposition, and thus it was that the Transvaal has acquired the northern frontier of Natal and the environs of Vryheid, thus separating Swaziland from English territory.

This land of the Swazis is also a gold-mining

territory, and this has produced there, although in a much less degree than in the Transvaal, a certain amount of foreign immigration. According to the current opinion that the Boers beheld the discovery of the gold mines and the settlement of the Uitlanders to work them with profound patriotic anguish, they ought to have taken good care not to touch Swaziland. But, on the contrary, it is since the discovery of this wealth that they have made repeated efforts to acquire it. True it is that between these countries and the sea there is only a narrow belt. "When I have Swaziland I shall go and look at the sea," said Krüger. The coast-line was occupied by chiefs with whom Ferreira had concluded treaties, conduct by no means in conformity with the 1884 Convention; in spite of which the South African Republic applied to the English Government for permission to annex the coast as far as the Portuguese territory. The demand was formulated in urgent but courteous terms; it insisted on the advantage it would be for the Republic to have access to the sea; the concession could only render the relations of the two States more cordial, and would overcome the danger of Ferreira possibly transferring the rights he had obtained from the chiefs to any other Power than England. Besides, they said further, the

cession of this strip of land could in no way be disadvantageous to England, and if she refused, it could only be because she aimed at keeping the Republic as far as possible from the sea, retarding her development and *thus finally annihilating her.*

It is agreed that if there is one concession which is more painful to England and more repugnant than any other, it is that of a seaport; and yet even under these circumstances England did not absolutely refuse it. Sir Hercules Robinson replied that in principle England was not hostile to the legitimate desire of the South African Republic to communicate with the sea, but he argued there were English interests in Swaziland which could then no longer be protected by England. To this the Transvaalers made this characteristic reply, "Give us Swaziland also, that will solve the difficulty, and your interests will be protected."

Desiring to settle the question in a friendly manner, England sent a Commissioner, who proposed to cede the port of Kosi Bay to the Transvaal, and to grant the right to unite this seaport to its territory by a railway. However, besides some commercial conditions, they imposed a prohibition against ever making over this port to any foreign Power, and the obligation, in case of difficulties with any foreign

Power regarding it, of entrusting the negotiations to England.

These proposals were incorporated in a convention to be signed and ratified within the space of three years. If at the end of that time the Transvaal had not taken possession of the territory ceded, it was to come to an end. Although the term was prolonged by a year, the Transvaal did not move, and the convention fell through. During several successive years the Ferreira people continued their intrigues with the chiefs of the coast, and the Government did not fail to turn to account what they called their rights in this part of the country. Then England at last lost patience, established her protectorate on the littoral, from Natal to the Portuguese possessions, and thus definitely closed the access to the sea to the Transvaal, who had not chosen to profit by the occasion that had been offered to her.

Whilst these negotiations were pending, the Boers had not remained quiet. On the north they had organised an armed trek which was to settle in Mashonaland. It numbered several thousands, and one of the bands was under the command of Colonel Ferreira. As soon as the frontier was crossed, a proclamation was to declare the Northern Republic founded, and a provisional government established; in a few

years this new State would have been absorbed in the Transvaal. But the expedition failed: it was stopped by English regulars commanded by General Carrington, and by the police force of the Chartered Company under Dr Jameson. Krüger did not insist on what he called the rights of the Transvaalers over Mashonaland, and he obtained as a compensation the protectorate of Swaziland.

If I enter into some details on what I should call the foreign policy of the Transvaal, it is because all her acts show clearly the fixed determination not to consider herself bound by the conventions with England, and to extend her territory by conquest. On the other hand, it will be seen that in all her disputes with the Republic, England has always granted her turbulent neighbour a part of her demands, although they were opposed to the formal articles of the convention. At the time of the declaration of war the Transvaal territory was more extensive than in 1881: it was increased by the acquisition of the Little Free State, to which was added later the protectorate of Swaziland. During four years the Boers had every facility offered them to create a seaport, of which it is true they did not avail themselves; and above all, in the London Convention, which was supposed to bind them, England renounced

almost all the rights which the Pretoria convention had conferred on her. And yet we are daily being told of the conspiracy set on foot by England to deprive the Transvaal of her independence! A strange manner, indeed, of enslaving a people—to extend their territory, to renounce the greater part of the rights that suzerainty brings with it, and to offer them one of the most powerful weapons for their defence —namely, communication with abroad by means of a seaport.

And here again we must go back and inquire who is responsible for all these disputes. It is Krüger's Government which has been the moving spirit of these unjustified claims, and has lent its support to those violations of treaties which it never loyally accepted. It is owing to this Government that the independence of the Transvaal became so intolerable to its powerful neighbour that even the Gladstone Cabinet and its Ministers, Lord Derby and Lord Ripon, always so complaisant towards the Boers, were several times on the very point of war; whilst on its side the Orange Free State under Sir John Brand's government led a peaceful and quiet life. We see in what way the Transvaal Government understands and exercises its independence; and here, remembering that I belong

to a little country whose independence has for centuries been as dear to it as its existence, I am sickened at the idea that this cherished name should be given to what has been but too often merely contempt for the most solemn engagements.

THE ARMAMENTS.

THE desire to extend her territory and to establish her rule over the English element, if not to banish it altogether, must, of course, have led the Transvaal to arm herself and to prepare for all eventualities, particularly for the opportunity, on no account to be missed, when England should be engaged in a quarrel with a European Power, and the field would be free in Africa. In the document I have already quoted, Mr Fisher tells us it is only since the Jameson Raid that the Boers have laid in a stock of arms and ammunition, and this assertion is a favourite theme with the pro-Boer press. Not only do they not dream of questioning its truth, but they even make it a matter for boasting that the Boers, when threatened with the loss of their independence, knew how to take the necessary measures for its effectual defence in good time.

But Mr Fisher must be well aware that long before the Jameson Raid the Uitlanders bitterly complained of the armaments made with their

money, but directed, as they well knew, against themselves; and in particular, in the petition of 1895, they protested, and very rightly, against the construction of a fort which commands the town of Johannesburg and which cost over £100,000, not to speak of the £250,000 employed for a like purpose and large orders to Krupp and others. Already in 1882 the manifesto issued on the founding of the Bond—a manifesto which was so violent as to frighten moderate members like Mr Hofmeyr—lays stress on the absolute necessity for arming the Free State and the Transvaal in order to expel, root and branch, the British element from South Africa, as a scourge of which they must rid themselves at any cost. But in order to arm they needed money, and much money. Creusot guns cannot be purchased with finances as dilapidated as those of the Transvaal in 1884, when the envoys to London had to appeal to the generosity of their English friends. For that was needed the hated Uitlanders, and their greed for drawing gold from the lands where formerly a few farmers pastured their herds watched by Kaffirs. Thanks to the work of the Johannesburg foreigners, the Boers have been enabled to construct forts designed to overawe a numerous but unarmed population; they have been enabled to purchase guns of the latest construction and Mauser

rifles of acknowledged superiority, and to pay foreign instructors to teach the Transvaalers the use of these weapons.

And not only that, but they have procured them in sufficient quantities to arm the Orange State as well, Krüger being first assured of its support. The weapons used by the Orange Free State were also paid for with the Uitlanders' gold; and even so late as last summer, on the eve of the conflict, they were being passed through the Cape — that is to say, through British territory. It is known that Sir Alfred Milner represented this to Mr Schreiner, Prime Minister of Cape Colony, and that he replied that the Orange Free State being a friendly State with whom our relations were excellent, there was no reason to prevent them providing themselves with arms. Here again, sooner than strain her strict rights, England allowed her adversary to make preparations which were openly directed against her, and from which she has had to suffer most cruelly.

The armaments, which go back to the earliest time when the Transvaal had the money necessary for them, found encouragement and an excellent excuse in the Jameson Raid. This raid must certainly be described as criminal: it was an outrage committed by the foreigner on the Transvaal Government. But without wishing to mitigate

the severity of the condemnation passed on this action, we must nevertheless appraise it at its right value, and not allow ourselves to be carried away by our indignation, which Krüger's Government knows well how to cultivate for his own profit. A criminal, however guilty, should not have the criminal character of his conduct exaggerated, but, on the contrary, has the right that extenuating circumstances should be sought for. And if we study the true causes which provoked the raid, we should be able to make more than one comparison, and find in Europe more than one analogous case, which a great number of pro-Boers celebrate as glorious.

It is certain that, except for the very regrettable death of four burghers, the Jameson Raid bore only the most happy fruits for the Transvaal, or rather for the Krüger Government. The number of the raiders being 400, they could, with some appearance of truth, tax the English nation, or at least one of her Ministers, with the responsibility. Jameson Raid! Has not this tune been drummed into our ears till we are deaf to the voice of calm and reason? For the last three years it has been the supreme argument which has superseded the examination of the question itself. Let us look for a moment at the results this act of aggression has had on the victim. She saw the sympathy not only

of the German Emperor and all Europe immediately turn towards her, but, what was much more useful, that of the Afrikanders of the Free State and Cape Colony, which had been more or less alienated. And, above all, the English Government was paralysed: any energetic action on its part would have been interpreted as a confession of complicity. Nothing could have been more fatal to England's action, or more contrary to the political lines she had till then followed, than this expedition which could only lead to failure. We have already seen that, so far from attacking the independence of the Republic, England had allowed it to extend its territory and its influence, and had offered it access to the sea. Had she wished to act in a hostile manner towards the Transvaal, she would have resisted territorial encroachments, and have forced Krüger's Government to respect the Conventions. Even the Liberal Cabinet admitted there had been more than one *casus belli*. There were wanting neither pretexts nor wrongs to make a case of. We may apply to the raid the famous saying, "It is worse than a crime, it is a blunder." Can Mr Chamberlain's enemies really suppose that, knowing as he did the strength of the position he held with respect to the Transvaal, he would in mere lightness of heart have tied his own hands? For the im-

potence of the English Government at that moment was complete, and the conduct of the Governor of the Cape, Sir Hercules Robinson, who arrived at Pretoria the day after the raid, may well be taxed with weakness.

A great deal has been said about the Jameson case, and of his officers who were tried in England, and opinion proclaimed its indignation very noisily against what it considered a scandal of indulgence: very much less has been said, and much less indignation manifested, about the case tried in Pretoria of sixty-four Uitlanders who, with two or three exceptions, desired that their claims and demands should be tried beneath the national flag of the Transvaal, and who had done all in their power to stop Jameson before his departure and even during his march. Sir Hercules Robinson did not interfere in any way to prevent Krüger from having them arrested, nor to deliver them from the prison at Pretoria and from the hands of the jailer, Du Plessis, whose character and conduct are described to us by Mr Fitz-Patrick.

Not only the prisoners but all the Uitlanders have been the victims of the raid; their cause has been ruined, and the hand of the Boer Government has weighed even more heavily upon them than before. Even the promises which Mr Chamberlain succeeded in obtaining from Presi-

dent Krüger on their behalf, if they have not been looked on as null and void, were fulfilled like that of the municipal organisation of Johannesburg.[1]

But it is above all for the armaments that the raid came as an unexpected justification. These forts, these Krupp guns, these foreign instructors against whom the Uitlanders had vainly protested — they could now be multiplied without scruple. Is it not the prime duty of every Government to prepare the defence of its country, and to be armed for the hour of danger? Should England have the audacity to remonstrate against these armaments, which seemed to her so disproportionate, they had an answer ready in Jameson's horse and their Maxim guns.

So we see that several years before the war there was an organisation ready to be set in movement at the favourable moment, or when events should occur which would ensure its success. It was like a loaded shell in the African colonial edifice of Great Britain, which at a given moment could shake it to its foundations, or even accomplish its ruin. Let us picture to ourselves England engaged in some foreign complication, a war like that which might have broken out on the Fashoda question. Krüger

[1] The Transvaal Question, pp. 38-42.

and his Boers would have had no difficulty in finding a pretext of some sort for taking up arms, and until they got to the Cape would have met nothing to stop them. Whether from weakness or indifference, England seems to have ignored this very real danger and to have done nothing to remove it: she did not even utter a protest against the arming of the country. It is true that since she had not listened to the voice of the Uitlanders at the outset, she was less able to act after the raid. And yet even this absence of necessary precautions of all kinds did not hinder Krüger for many years past from speaking of England's desire to annihilate the South African Republic.

He must indeed be possessed with the anti-English passion which has seized a part of the Continental press who believes that it is England that declared war, or that when Mr Krüger sent out his ultimatum it was a ruse of Mr Chamberlain to get his enemy to declare it. When the Transvaalers, armed from head to foot, left their redoubt at the auspicious moment and crossed the frontier, they found themselves face to face with General White's little army, composed almost entirely of Indian garrisons hurriedly despatched, a small number of regulars, and some volunteers from Kimberley and Mafeking. These were the troops that Krüger had

pointed out as threatening the security of the Transvaal! Besides, the Boers themselves were not long in giving the war its true character. No sooner was the frontier crossed than, like the sultans of old, they hastened to proclaim as their property the territory beneath their feet; and, better still, before a single shot had been fired the President of the Orange Free State published a proclamation by which he declared territory of the Free State all that part of Griqualand West which lies on the north bank of the Vaal. At the same time he, chief of a State which had always lived in perfect harmony with England and had no misunderstanding even with that Power, addressed these words to his compatriots: "I have ordered my officers to cross the frontier of Cape Colony for the sole purpose of defending my country and my people, and to protect our independence."

WHAT ADVICE SHALL WE OFFER TO THE BOERS?

I DO not know if I have succeeded in leading my readers to share in the conviction which, to my mind, results from this study of the bare facts, namely, that England never sought to interfere with the independence of the Transvaal from the time she restored it to her in 1884; but that, on the contrary, she granted her concessions nowhere prescribed by the conventions, and even allowed the collection of immense armaments which were manifestly to be used against her. She offered no opposition to this, either from want of foresight or because she would not appear to support the Jameson Raid. And if the ground of dispute has now been removed to the question of independence, if it is for this that the Boers are fighting, it was certainly Krüger who raised this question of his own good pleasure sooner than make concessions which were hateful to him who had staked his all on the game.

By thus making independence the stakes

which he voluntarily risked, Krüger settled the final conclusion of the war in a most positive manner. Seldom has the issue of a war been so clearly defined from the very beginning: doubtless there might have been another issue, but that was only a dream cherished by Krüger and his Dutchmen, a dream that they would obtain satisfaction from the hated and despised English; that, favoured by a rising of the colonists, they would seize British territory, and that once masters of the South of Africa, they would establish a republic of which the Transvaal is the picture in miniature,—at the head the oligarchy of the burghers, beneath them their foreign subjects, then the blacks, whose condition, in fact if not in name, would be that of slaves. This solution could only be realised by the aid of international complications the consequence of which would have been felt by the entire world, and not have been limited by the fall of the two South African republics. And we need not take it into consideration.

The other solution, which was clear and certain from the hour the Transvaal launched its ultimatum, is the loss of its independence and its annexation to English colonial territory. Some generous souls desire to see England once again record an act of magnanimity and repeat within narrower limits what was done after Majuba. But

can it not be seen that on this point England cannot make terms—that it is the one point on which circumstances force her to remain inexorable; and that the entire British nation unanimously desire before all things that a repetition of this South African conflict be rendered impossible. This desire, or rather I would say the authoritative will, of the nation, which it is the duty of the Government to put into execution, entails first of all the disarming of the Transvaal and the taking over by England of the direction of military affairs; then the suppression of their diplomatic relations with foreign Courts, so that no more Leyds' missions may be sent to Europe; and after that the organisation of a Raad to which Uitlanders will have access, and where they will be represented in proportion to their numbers and not be limited to a fourth; finally, an arrangement of the financial question in such a way that a minority shall no longer be able to dispose as it likes of a budget almost entirely furnished by tax-payers who have no voice in the matter. What will remain of their independence? A word without meaning, not in the least answering to the reality, and of no use but to nourish vain hopes and useless regrets in their minds. And we see that this state of things goes far beyond the concession of the five years' franchise to which Kruger declared he preferred annexation.

Their independence is gone—that is a fact which rises before the vanquished in all its brutality, and from which it is useless for them to hide their eyes. And once again I appeal to the friends of the Boers, and entreat them not to incite so brave and courageous a people to persist in a useless conflict which can only add to their sufferings without in the slightest degree ameliorating their final condition. Far be it from me, or from any true Swiss, to propose to a people, however small, a capitulation in which their honour shall suffer. The Boers from the first have vindicated the honour of their country by their heroism and self-abnegation, and it is by this same glorious end that they have gained a place in history. One may surrender when one has fought bravely, and may even receive the honours of war.

There is a talk of fighting to the bitter end—of continuing a guerilla warfare; but to what purpose? The Boers cannot hear the guns of troops coming to their aid, as did the defenders of Ladysmith and Mafeking; they must depend on their own forces, which are wellnigh exhausted. Guerilla warfare is all very well in Spain or in Mexico, where there is a hope of driving out the enemy, or at least of keeping a part of the territory where the inhabitants can maintain themselves. But when the English troops occupy Pretoria, when all

the rich and populous portions of the country as well as the seat of government are in the hands of an empire whose soldiers they cannot hope to defeat, what will there be left to defend? The government will no longer exist; monetary resources will be dried up, since the gold mines will be in the hands of the enemy. A few groups of farmers banded together under the Vierkleur and wandering about in vast territories sparsely inhabited do not suffice to constitute a State. This guerilla warfare will be only man-hunting, where each of the adversaries will alternately have more or less success.

Therefore I do not hesitate to urge the Boers to surrender and to accept the conditions imposed by Great Britain. I would tell them again, You have saved your honour, more effectually even than Francis I. at Pavia, by an obstinate and tenacious resistance, by a courage rendered the more worthy of our admiration in that it will always be clothed in shadow and that the names of your heroes will remain unknown. Now, as the dying Villebois-Mareuil said to his companions, you can hoist the white flag. It is only then that you can appeal to the generosity of the victor with legitimate hopes of being heard. This generosity cannot extend to your independence, as I think I have already fully demonstrated. England cannot

yield on this question. She cannot expose herself to a chance, however remote, of seeing a war like this recommence, and her Government owes an absolute guarantee of this to the empire. But where England can show herself magnanimous is on the question of autonomy, on the *modus vivendi* which she will create for the Boers under the shadow of her flag; and here again the lines are already traced beforehand, not so much by circumstances as by the character and history of the English people.

We are told that the Boers fought so well that it is not right to make subjects of them. Throughout the vast empire over which Queen Victoria reigns every one calls himself a British subject, which means that every one is a subject of the Queen, and lives under her Government; but of subject-races—that is to say, races under the direct authority of another privileged race — with the exception of the heathen and half-civilised native races, there are none. It is in the Transvaal that we find the best examples of real subjects in the strict or literal sense of the word. The Boers will lose their independence, it is true, but they will receive in exchange that liberty which is the very basis of the whole English colonial rule. It is in colonies, established for the most part by the energy and spontaneous efforts of the first settlers, that individual action has the greatest value and

that the hand of the State is least felt. There are no countries in the world more free than Canada and Cape Colony, because there the individual is accustomed to reckon first on himself and his own efforts, and above all not to be constantly looking to the State, which indeed at the outset did not even exist. Little by little it was organised, and the administration with its different departments was evolved as the need of it began to be felt, and it is, therefore, reduced to a simplicity which contrasts strongly with that of countries which are notwithstanding proud of their liberty.

This idea of liberty differs materially from that conceived by the Boers. What they call liberty is the right to keep for themselves exclusively the domination over the foreigners, who, more numerous than themselves, have brought them riches and prosperity, but to whom they refuse any participation in the government. A singular liberty that, whose true name is licence. To say that the Boers are fighting for liberty is laughable: they are fighting, on the contrary, to keep the power to close the door to liberty.

From what is said in England by those most competent to know, I gather that as soon as it is possible—as soon, that is to say, as calm and tranquillity reign once more—the South African Republics, united to the British Crown, will be given the same autonomy which the other colonies

enjoy; and I think that it is in this way that the generosity of England, to which reference has been made, can best manifest itself,—by forcing herself to understand and enter into the ideas of the Boers, and by bearing in mind as far as possible their sympathies, and, who knows, perhaps also their prejudices. The more ample the autonomy granted them, the more it retains of their laws and rural and municipal organisation, so far as these are compatible with the sovereign authority and the principles of liberty, so much the less will the change be felt, and so much the sooner will the fusion between victor and vanquished be produced, as it has been in Canada.

England cannot repeat too often—she is not fighting to get rid of the Boers; she has no intention of reversing the parts, and making of the Uitlanders, or even of the British element, a new oligarchy which would secure for itself at the expense of the former masters the same privileges which they so abused. England wishes to create a colonial State in which the two races shall be on a footing of equality; that is to say, she is prepared to give to the vanquished the same rights as to her own people, so that the two races may together contribute to the prosperity of their State according to the resources and capabilities of each.

And it is evident that this equality and autonomy will be established all the sooner if the Boers' surrender be prompt and complete. The transition state which must of necessity follow the war, be it one of martial law or administration as a Crown Colony—that is to say, directly dependent on the government of the mother country—will be of but short duration if the Boers, instead of applying to America or elsewhere, turn rather to Great Britain and lay down their arms; while a guerilla warfare, on the contrary, by prolonging the period of strife and hostility, will only serve to add fresh suffering to that beneath which the people on both sides have been groaning for the last six months, and also to retard the time when the mass of the population can heal their wounds in tranquillity and peace, and obtain that autonomy which will be the true and only compensation for the loss of their independence.

In a conversation held in Holland with the three delegates, one of them, Mr Wessels, said in concluding: "I can assure you, we may be defeated, but we shall never be subdued." These words look heroic, and have a ringing sound. "Have pity on your people!" I would say to Mr Wessels. "Have they not answered with sufficient earnestness to your appeal? Have they not sacrificed enough in this war, which was of

your making? If they are now mourning the loss of their independence through having followed you too faithfully, do not urge them to desperate resolutions, but leave them to try the liberty which their conqueror offers them."

GENEVA, *May* 1900.

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